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Abstract 
Two experiments critically examined a predictive-coding based account of the vulnerability 
of short-term memory to auditory distraction, particularly the disruptive effect of changing-
state sound on verbal serial recall. Experiment 1 showed that providing participants with the 
opportunity to predict the contents of an imminent spoken distractor sentence via a 
forewarning reduced its particularly disruptive effect but only to the same level of disruption 
as that produced by ‘simpler’ changing-state sequences (a sequence of letter-names). 
Moreover, a post-categorically unpredictable changing-state sequence (e.g., “F, B, H, E …”) 
was no more disruptive than a post-categorically predictable sequence (“A, B, C, D …”). 
Experiment 2 showed that a sentence distractor was disruptive regardless of whether 
participants reported adopting a serial rehearsal strategy to perform the focal task (in this 
case, a missing-item task) whereas, critically, the disruptive effect of simpler changing-state 
sequences was only found in participants who reported using a serial rehearsal strategy. 
Moreover, when serial rehearsal was not used to perform the focal task, the disruptive effect 
of sentences was completely abolished by a forewarning. These results indicate that 
predictability plays no role in the classical changing-state irrelevant sound effect and that 
foreknowledge selectively attenuates a functionally distinct stimulus-specific attentional-
diversion effect. As such, the results are at odds with a unitary, attentional, account of 
auditory distraction in short-term memory and instead strongly support a duplex-mechanism 
account.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Auditory distraction; Serial recall; Predictive coding; Short-term 
memory; Interference-by-process; Duplex-mechanism account. 
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There has in recent decades been a great deal of interest in the idea that a key function 
of the brain is to generate a predictive model of the environment and one’s actions upon it 
(for reviews, see Clark, 2013; Huang & Rao, 2011; Winkler, Denham, & Nelken, 2009). In 
the present paper, we scrutinize the explanatory value of this predictive coding theory in the 
context of its recent application to the marked disruptive effect of task-irrelevant sound on 
short-term serial recall, a phenomenon that has long played a prominent role in the study of 
short-term memory, selective attention, and their inter-relationship (e.g., Baddeley, 1983, 
2007; Beaman & Jones, 1997; Buchner, Irmen, & Erdfelder, 1996; Colle & Welsh, 1976; 
Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997; Elliott, 2002; Elliott, & Briganti, 2012; Hanley & Hayes, 2012; 
Hughes & Jones, 2001; Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones, Macken, & Nicholls, 2004; Klatte, 
Lachmann, Schlittmeier, & Hellbrück, 2010). The predictability-based account claims that 
the disruption is due to the fact that the involuntary formation of a model of a relatively 
unpredictable sound sequence draws upon attentional resources required to perform the focal 
memory task (Bell, Röer, Marsh, Storch, & Buchner, 2017; Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002; Röer, 
Bell, & Buchner, 2015). We will argue here, however, that whereas predictive coding plays a 
role in some cases of auditory distraction, it does not underpin the classical effect of 
changing-state sound on serial short-term memory (e.g., Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992; 
Jones & Macken, 1993).  
It is well established that serial recall is impaired appreciably by the mere presence of 
task-irrelevant sound (e.g., Colle & Welsh, 1976; Elliott, 2002; Hanley & Bakopolou, 2003; 
Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2007; Jones & Macken, 1993; Röer et al., 2015; Salamé & 
Baddeley, 1982). In a typical study in this paradigm, a sequence of around 6-8 verbal stimuli 
(e.g., seven or eight digits) is presented on a screen, one item at a time, at the rate of about 1 
or 2 per second, which must then be recalled in strict serial order (i.e., visual-verbal serial 
recall). During presentation of the to-be-remembered items—or/and, in some studies, during 
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a retention interval between the last item and a recall cue—sound is presented at a moderate 
intensity [up to around 65dB(A)] that is irrelevant to the recall task and which is to be 
ignored. Of particular interest for present purposes is that the key precondition for reliable 
and marked disruption of serial recall, as far as the sound is concerned, is that it must contain 
acoustical variation. This has been dubbed the changing-state effect, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for which is an acoustic change between immediately successive sounds 
that form a single perceptual stream (cf. Bregman, 1990). Thus, a sequence of changing 
speech stimuli (e.g., “A, Q, J, G...”) presented in a single voice, or a sequence of pure tones 
changing to a relatively modest degree in frequency from one to the next, impairs serial recall 
appreciably. In contrast, a repeated stimulus (e.g., “A, A, A, A…”, or a repeating tone) 
produces much less disruption, if any (e.g., Campbell, Beaman, & Berry, 2002; Elliott, 2002; 
Hughes et al., 2007; Jones et al., 1992, 1995; Jones & Macken, 1993; LeCompte, 1996; 
Parmentier & Beaman, 2014). 
The predictability-based account posits that changing-state sound is more disruptive 
than steady-state sound because the former draws more attentional resources away from the 
focal memory task (Bell et al., 2017; Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002; Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 
2014, 2015; Röer, Bell, Dentale, & Buchner, 2011). This account appeals to the well-
accepted notion embedded in predictive coding theory that a predictive model of the ongoing 
auditory scene is generated, one function of which is to alert the organism to potentially 
important environmental changes (e.g., Hughes & Jones, 2003; Näätänen, 1990; Schröger, 
1997; for a recent review, see Winkler & Schröger, 2015). Two key tenets of the 
predictability-based account of the changing-state effect are that: i) the process of predictive 
model-building demands limited attentional resources; and ii) attentional resources are 
demanded to the extent that the successive elements in the sequence are difficult to predict, 
that is, to the extent that the model needs to be updated in light of prediction-errors. Thus, an 
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accurate predictive model of a steady-state sequence can be fashioned quickly because of the 
high degree of predictability of each successive sound. Hence, generating such a model takes 
relatively few resources away from the task at hand, leaving performance relatively 
unscathed. In contrast, the attempt to build a model of a changing-state sequence draws 
relatively heavily on attentional resources due to the relative unpredictability of its elements, 
thereby impairing serial recall appreciably. In this view, then, “the changing-state effect is 
just another example of the general principle that distraction increases with the 
unpredictability of the distractor material” (Röer et al., 2015, p. 693).  
In the present article, our argument is not with the assumption that a predictive model 
of the auditory scene is generated nor with the idea that such model-building plays some role 
in auditory distraction during short-term memory performance. Rather, our argument is that 
attentional diversion based on unpredictability (or rather, we have argued, the violation of 
predictions; cf. Vachon et al., 2012; see also Parmentier, Elsley, Andrés, & Barceló, 2011) 
only accounts for one of two distinct forms of auditory distraction. In particular, we argue 
that it does not underpin the classic changing-state effect. According to the duplex-
mechanism account of auditory distraction (Hughes, 2014; Hughes, Hurlstone, Marsh, & 
Jones, 2013; Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2005, 2007), whereas some kinds of auditory input 
can indeed disrupt serial recall (and other tasks) via predictability-based attentional diversion 
(see below), the changing-state effect is instead due to interference-by-process (e.g., Hughes 
& Marsh, 2017; Jones & Tremblay, 2000). On this account, any sequential predictiveness (or 
invariance) within the auditory scene is conceptualized as but one cue out of several that the 
perceptual system can exploit in the task of determining whether or not successive sounds 
have emanated from the same environmental event. That is, the brain must perceptually 
organize the initially undifferentiated mixture of soundwaves reaching the ears into 
temporally-extended objects or ‘streams’ corresponding to the various sound-emitting events 
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that created that mixture (i.e., sequential streaming; cf. Bregman, 1990; Winkler & Schröger, 
2015). Thus, whilst our account, like the attentional diversion account, incorporates the 
concept of predictive coding, the changing-state effect is a by-product of streaming processes, 
not predictive coding per se. In line with Bregman (1990), we assume that streaming, 
including the use of predictability as a cue to streaming, is a preattentive process; it does not 
draw some limited attentional resource away from ongoing task-relevant processing (e.g., 
Macken et al., 2003). Rather, the changing-state effect arises because a by-product of 
preattentive streaming interferes specifically with a similar process involved in the focal 
serial recall task. Specifically, if there are spectral differences between successive, 
segmentable, sounds but those sounds are nevertheless similar enough to be integrated into a 
single stream (i.e., attributed to the same environmental source), the order of those sounds is 
preattentively registered (Jones et al., 1999; Macken et al., 2003). These involuntarily 
registered order cues interfere with the similar, but deliberate, process of assembling and 
maintaining the serial order of the to-be-remembered items in the form of a vocal-motor plan 
(e.g., Hughes & Marsh, 2017; Jones & Macken, 1993).  
According to the duplex-mechanism account (Hughes, 2014), distraction due to 
attentional diversion is distinct from distraction caused by interference-by-process, though 
both are related ultimately to sequential streaming (Hughes, 2014; Macken, 2014). On this 
account, there are two main sources of attentional diversion1: In stimulus-aspecific attentional 
diversion (cf. Eimer, Nattkemper, Schröger, & Prinz, 1996), the auditory input diverts 
attention from an ongoing task due to the fact that it does not “fit” within the prevailing 
auditory scene; its attention-diverting power does not derive from any feature specific to the 
stimulus itself. For example, a B tone in the context of A tones (“AAAAABAA”) could 
                                               
1 To avoid potential confusion, it may be worth emphasizing that these are two sub-types within the second main 
type of distraction (attentional diversion) in the duplex-mechanism account.  
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divert attention but, equally, so could an A tone in the context of B tones (“BBBBBABB”; 
Schröger, 1997). Thus, in the context of serial recall, we have shown that a single sound 
presented in a different voice (Hughes et al., 2007, 2013) or with a different timing (Hughes 
et al., 2005) from the remainder of the tokens within an irrelevant sound sequence disrupts 
performance (the deviation effect; for a review, see Hughes, 2014). We have argued that such 
stimulus-aspecific attentional diversion occurs to the extent that a sound is perceived as not 
belonging to an already established stream; that is, it diverts attention because it violates the 
current preattentively-generated model of the auditory scene (e.g., Hughes, 2014; Hughes & 
Jones, 2003; Hughes et al., 2005; Vachon, Hughes, & Jones, 2012; see also Sussman, 
Horváth, Winkler, & Orr, 2007; Winkler & Schröger, 2015). This conceptualization of 
aspecific attentional diversion differs in two important ways from that in the attentional 
diversion account of the changing-state effect (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015): First, as 
noted, we argue that the process of integrating sounds into a stream—which forms the 
context against which a sound can divert attention—is preattentive; it does not, therefore, 
consume attentional resources away from focal task processing. Second, stimulus-aspecific 
attentional diversion occurs when a sound is perceived that cannot be integrated into an 
already established stream whereas the changing-state effect arises due to the perception of 
changes within an already established stream.    
The second, non-mutually exclusive, sub-type of attentional diversion within the 
duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction is stimulus-specific attentional diversion 
(cf. Eimer et al., 1996; Hughes, 2014). Here, the specific content or quality of the distractor is 
critical to its attention-diverting power. Attention is diverted in this case because the 
stimulus, in and of itself, has some kind of relevance or interest for the organism. The most 
famous example of such stimulus-specific attentional diversion in the cognitive-experimental 
literature is the so-called “cocktail party effect” in which hearing one’s own name is 
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especially likely to divert attention from ongoing goal-relevant processing (Moray, 1959). 
But other examples would include a crying baby (particularly for its main caregiver(s)) or the 
word “food” for a hungry person, taboo words (Röer, Körner, Bell, & Buchner, 2017a) and 
other emotionally valent words (Buchner, Mehl, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2006; Buchner, 
Rothermund, Wentura, & Mehl, 2004; Marsh et al., 2018).  
Predicting Distraction: The Effects of Foreknowledge  
One means of examining the extent to which predictability-based attentional diversion 
underpins the disruptive effect of task-irrelevant auditory stimuli on serial recall is to 
examine whether giving participants the power to predict the sequence via a forewarning 
about its content attenuates that disruptive effect. For example, in Hughes et al. (2013), we 
showed that the disruptive effect on serial recall of a single deviation in the voice conveying a 
sequence of irrelevant speech tokens was eliminated when participants were informed a few 
seconds before a trial that the irrelevant sequence would contain a deviant (compared to not 
being informed)2. In contrast, forewarning participants that an upcoming sequence would be a 
changing-state sequence (as opposed to a steady-state sequence) had no effect on its 
disruptive impact. These results are consistent with the duplex-mechanism account: A 
forewarning eliminated the effect of a deviant because this effect is underpinned by aspecific 
attentional diversion caused by the violation of a predictive model. That is, the forewarning 
                                               
2 Bell et al. (2017) reported that the effect of a deviant was not reduced by foreknowledge and 
concluded that this finding “disconfirms the prediction of the duplex model that the deviation effect is 
more amenable to cognitive control than the changing-state effect” (p. 366). However, the deviant in 
Bell et al.’s study only produced a very small performance decrement (around 2-3%) whereas the 
decrement in the relevant experiment of Hughes et al. (2013, Experiment 2) was around 10%. As the 
authors themselves have pointed out (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015), it would be difficult to 
observe a benefit of foreknowledge on distraction if the amount of distraction is very small in the first 
place. This discrepancy in the size of the deviation effect may be due to the use of a (probably more 
salient) deviation in voice in Hughes et al. (2013) as opposed to a word-deviation (e.g., “fall, fall, fall, 
dog...”) in Bell et al. (2017). In line with this interpretation, the voice-deviation effect has been found 
to have an effect size (Cohen’s d) in the range of .82 – 1.67 (based on four experiments reported by 
Hughes et al., 2007, 2013) whereas the word-deviation effect (based on the three experiments reported 
in Bell et al. 2017) is consistently much smaller (Cohen’s d in the range .32 – .49). 
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afforded the opportunity to include, in a top-down manner, the deviant as part of the 
predictive model, hence stripping it of its usual disruptive power. In contrast, the finding that 
a forewarning had no influence on the changing-state effect is in line with the view that this 
effect is not caused by attentional diversion but by some other mechanism (e.g., interference-
by-process). 
Interest in the present article centres on the recent claim that the changing-state effect 
is indeed reduced by foreknowledge, suggesting, contrary to the duplex-mechanism account, 
that the changing-state effect is, like the deviation effect, due to predictability-based 
attentional diversion. Röer et al. (2015) suggested that foreknowledge about whether an 
imminent distractor sequence was a changing- or a steady-state sequence (cf. Hughes et al., 
2013) may not have been specific enough to produce a foreknowledge effect. When they 
instead presented a forewarning that specifically informed participants about what the 
changing-state sequence would contain—e.g., a written transcript of an upcoming speech  
sequence—its disruptive effect was indeed attenuated. This result was taken as supporting the 
view that the changing-state effect is due to attentional diversion (Röer et al., 2015; see also 
Bell et al., 2017). 
However, the central argument we make in the present article is that the attenuation of 
the changing-state effect by foreknowledge reported by Röer et al. (2015) was not an 
attenuation of the changing-state effect but the attenuation of an attentional diversion effect 
superimposed upon a real changing-state effect. The starting point for our argument is the 
observation that the critical “changing-state sequence” in Röer et al. (2015) was a naturally 
spoken sentence (with a different sentence presented on each changing-state trial)—e.g., 
“Pour water, lemon juice, and sugar in a cooking pot, then stir gently until it boils and 
gradually fold in beaten egg white”. In contrast, the steady-state condition comprised a single 
word repeated in a regular rhythm. Röer et al.’s (2015) rationale for using what they called a 
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‘complex changing-state sequence’ such as a sentence was that, according to the authors, a 
forewarning may only attenuate the effect of a changing-state sequence when the following 
three preconditions are met: i) the disruptive effect of the sound sequence must be relatively 
large, otherwise the attenuating impact of foreknowledge on that disruptive effect may not be 
empirically detectable; ii) related to the first precondition, the changing-state sequence must 
not already be highly predictable (e.g., “ABABAB…”) because providing a forewarning 
could not in that case effectively increase its predictability; and iii) participants are able, 
based on the forewarning, to form a stable representation of the sequence; thus, when, instead 
of sentences, a sequence of unrelated words was used as the changing-state sequence (what 
they called a ‘simple changing-state sequence’), no attenuation of its effect by a forewarning 
was found. This was because, the authors argued, a stable representation of a random word-
sequence could not be readily formed. 
We contend, and will go on to show, that Röer et al.’s (2015) conclusions are unsafe. 
To use a sentence as the changing-state sequence and contrast this with a regularly presented 
steady-state word is problematic because this putative manipulation of changing- vs. steady-
state sound is multiply confounded: Whilst a sentence is undoubtedly a changing-state 
sequence, it also has several other attributes that differentiate it from the temporally-regular 
repetition of a single word, including sentential meaning and grammatical and syntactical 
structure. We suggest that any or some combination of the properties of a natural sentence 
that are absent from a single repeating word could have caused an additional, functionally 
distinct, attentional diversion effect over and above an underlying (pure) changing-state effect 
and that only this attentional diversion-caused portion of the disruption was attenuated by 
foreknowledge. More specifically, we suggest that the inherent interest or relevance of a 
coherent, meaningful, spoken sentence to a language-using human participant (at least or 
especially a sentence that is also unfamiliar) causes some degree of stimulus-specific 
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attentional diversion over and above the classic, acoustic-based, changing-state effect. In this 
view, foreknowledge attenuates a sentence’s disruptive power by reducing its 
interestingess/relevance. If this is the case, the results of Röer et al. (2015; see also Bell et al., 
2017) leave the interference-by-process account of the changing-state effect—and the duplex-
mechanism account of distraction more broadly—unscathed.  
The general goal of the present study, then, was to demonstrate that the changing-state 
effect is not related to the predictability of the sound sequence, contrary to the account of 
Röer and colleagues. We sought to meet this objective in part by testing the hypothesis that 
the attenuation by foreknowledge of the disruptive effect of a ‘complex’ changing-state 
sequence on serial recall (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015) is the attenuation of an 
attentional diversion effect that is functionally separate from the ‘true’ changing-state effect.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we first sought to replicate the finding that what Röer and colleagues 
called a ‘complex’ changing-state sequence—a coherent sentence—is more disruptive than a 
sequence of unrelated verbal tokens (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015). Whilst the authors 
did not dwell on this aspect of their results, we suggest that this finding is in itself difficult to 
reconcile with a key part of their reasoning. As described earlier, they reasoned that the 
greater attenuating effect of foreknowledge on distraction by a sentence compared to the 
effect of foreknowledge on distraction by a sequence of unrelated tokens is due to the fact 
that it is easier to build a mental representation of the former than the latter kind of sequence: 
“meaningful, syntactically coherent speech can be easily processed when being attended 
before the trial, and can, therefore, be effectively converted into a predictive representation of 
the upcoming distractor sequence” (Bell et al., 2017, p. 366; emphasis added). But it seems to 
us that the reason why ‘meaningful, syntactically coherent speech can be easily processed’ is 
that these properties endow the successive tokens in a sentence with higher post-categorical 
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transitional probabilities than is the case for a sequence of unrelated tokens. In other words, it 
is the relatively high degree of post-categorical predictability of the successive elements in a 
sentence that makes the building of a stable mental representation of it relatively easy. 
Indeed, for the same reason, a coherent sentence is far better recalled in a short-term serial 
recall task than is a list made up of the same words in a random order:  “…syntactic and 
semantic factors increase the predictability of words in a sentence and may enhance memory 
in a process akin to chunking (Miller, 1956)” (Jefferies, Ralph, & Baddeley, 2004, p. 624; see 
also Brener, 1940). If so, the finding that a sentence is more, not less, disruptive than a 
sequence of unrelated (and hence less predictable) tokens is the opposite result to that 
predicted by the predictability-based account of the changing-state effect. In contrast, our 
alternative hypothesis about why the effect of a sentence is reduced by foreknowledge 
provides a straightforward explanation of the fact that a sentence is more disruptive than a 
sequence of unrelated tokens: It seems reasonable to suppose that an unfamiliar meaningful 
sentence would be instrinsically more relevant or interesting to the participant—and hence 
would be more likely to cause (stimulus-specific) attentional diversion—than a sequence of 
unrelated tokens. 
A second approach to testing the predictability-based account of the changing-state 
effect is to systematically manipulate the predictability of the changing-state sequence itself. 
Indeed, there is already evidence using such an approach that appears to be at odds with the 
predictability-based account: A relatively predictable speech sequence such as 
“CHJUCHJUCHJU . . .” is no less disruptive than a relatively unpredictable one such as 
“HJUCUCJHCUHJ . . .” (Jones et al., 1992; see also Tremblay & Jones 1998). However, 
proponents of the predictability-based account could perhaps counter that the predictability of 
the ‘predictable’ sequence in Jones et al. (1992) could only have emerged over the course of a 
trial or/and of the experimental session and hence its actual predictability may have remained 
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relatively low. We therefore took a different approach that capitalized on the fact that the 
predictability-based account clearly places a great deal of importance on the post-categorical 
predictability of a changing-state sequence. This is evident from the fact that the account 
supposes that the post-categorical features of a forewarning (meaning, syntax) play a key role 
in its attenuating effect on a sentence’s disruptive effect (Bell et al., 2017). Accordingly, a 
sentence’s disruptive potency (in the absence of foreknowledge) must derive, in part at least, 
from the relative unpredictability of its post-categorical features. This leads to a simple 
prediction: Regardless of foreknowledge, if the sequence itself is already highly post-
categorically predictable then it should be less disruptive than a sequence that is post-
categorically unpredictable. Of course, we have just argued that this has already been 
disconfirmed by Röer et al.’s (2015) own data (see also Bell et al., 2017) in the finding that a 
(relatively predictable) sentence was more not less disruptive than an unrelated (and hence 
unpredictable) sequence of tokens. Nonetheless, we also tested the prediction more 
systematically in the present experiment by contrasting two ‘simple’ changing-state (CS) 
conditions: a Simple CS-predictable condition in which the irrelevant sequence comprised the 
first 18 letters of the alphabet recited in alphabetical—and hence post-categorically 
predictable—order (e.g., “A, B, C, D…”) and a Simple CS-unpredictable sequence in which 
the exact same tokens were presented in a random—and hence relatively post-categorically 
unpredictable—order (e.g., “D, M, J, F …”).3 Moreover, a different random order was used 
for each trial in this latter condition, thereby making the sequence not only relatively 
unpredictable within a trial but also across trials (cf. Vachon et al., 2012). This should, from 
the standpoint of the predictability-based account, increase further the likelihood of observing 
greater disruption in this condition compared to the Simple CS-predictable condition (in 
                                               
3 Marsh et al. (2014) contrasted the effect of these two types of sequence but did not include a steady-state 
condition and so, strictly speaking, they did not have a measure of the changing-state effect. 
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which the exact same sequence was presented on every trial). In contrast, the interference-by-
process account denies any role for either post-categorical features (unpredictable or 
otherwise) or predictability in the changing-state effect (e.g., Hughes et al., 2013; Jones et al., 
1992; Marsh et al., 2018). As such, we predict no difference in the degree of disruption 
between these two conditions.  
Finally, we manipulated whether or not participants received a written specific 
forewarning about the content of the upcoming irrelevant spoken sequence. We predict that 
foreknowledge will, in a highly selective way, reduce that portion of the disruptive effect of a 
sentence that goes over and above that caused by the simpler (or, from our perspective, 
‘purer’) changing-state sequences. That is, it will selectively reduce the proportion of the 
sentence effect that we ascribe to its power to produce stimulus-specific attentional diversion 
and not affect the proportion of its effect that we ascribe to a separate, underlying, acoustic-
based changing-state effect.  
Method 
Participants. For this experiment, we aimed initially to recruit twenty-four participants, 
the same number recruited to test and demonstrate that attentional diversion by a deviant 
sound is eliminated by a forewarning (Hughes et al., 2013, Experiment 1). We therefore 
advertised 32 timeslots for testing (to accommodate a few no-shows or other difficulties in 
data collection). In the event, 28 participants were recruited and successfully tested. They 
were students from Royal Holloway, University of London, who took part in the experiment 
in return for being entered into a raffle for a £50 gift voucher. All reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. Ethical approval for the study was granted by 
the Ethics committee of Royal Holloway, University of London. 
Apparatus and materials. Memory lists. The lists to be recalled were visually presented 
and comprised eight digits taken pseudo-randomly without replacement from the set 1-9 with 
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the constraints that there were no ascending or descending runs of more than two digits and 
the list did not start with the digit 1. The digits were presented one at a time, in the central 
position of the computer monitor in black Arial Font size 72, with a duration of 800 ms and 
an inter-stimulus interval (offset-to-onset) of 200 ms. 
To-be-ignored auditory sequences.  All auditory stimuli were pre-recorded in the 
same male voice using a Sennheiser ME 65 microphone to 16-bit resolution at 22 kHz 
sampling rate with Sony Sound Forge Pro 10 software (Sony Creative Software). To generate 
the steady-state (SS) sequence and the two types of Simple changing-state (CS) sequences, 
the first 18 letters of the English alphabet were individually recorded and then each was 
edited to last 250 ms using the time-stretch function in Sound Forge Pro 10 without altering 
pitch or compromising intelligibility. For the SS sequence, the letter “A” was repeated 18 
times with an inter-stimulus interval of 206 ms (there were 17 such intervals) and so the total 
duration of the SS sequence was 8 s. The Simple CS-predictable sequence comprised the first 
18 letters of the English alphabet presented in canonical order and always starting with A 
(i.e., A, B, C…through to R) with the same stimulus-timing as the SS sequence. The Simple 
CS-unpredictable sequence comprised the same 18 letters as for the Simple CS-predictable 
sequence but in a random order (a different random order for each Simple CS-unpredictable 
trial within a block), again lasting 8 s. For the Complex CS sequences, 20 sentences were 
recorded. The sentences were drawn from various categories in line with Röer et al. (2015; 
although in the present experiment they were spoken in English—and hence were 
understandable by all our participants—rather than German). The sentence categories were: 
weather forecast, prose text, cooking recipe, scientific textbook, poetry, operating manual, 
road message, and aphorism (see Appendix 1). Each sentence was spoken in a manner 
appropriate for the sentence category and was recorded and re-recorded (if necessary) by the 
first author until it lasted approximately 8 s. It was then edited to last exactly 8 s (the same as 
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the other sequence-types) by eliminating a few ms of silence at the end of the recording or 
artificially reducing or increasing the length of the sentence via the timestretch function in 
Soundforge 10 (with care taken not to affect intelligibility). A different sentence was 
presented on each Complex CS(Sentence) trial (again as in Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 
2015). Regardless of auditory condition, the onset of the first word/letter coincided with the 
onset of the first to-be-remembered digit. All sounds were presented at approximately 
65dB(A). Finally, the number of words in each sentence equaled that in the other conditions 
(i.e., 18). This differs from Röer et al.’s (2015) method insofar as the number of words in 
their sentences varied, though it averaged 18. 
Forewarning.  The experiment was split into two blocks, a ‘with-forewarning block’ 
and a ‘no-forewarning block’ (see Design). On every trial in the with-forewarning block, a 
written transcription of the auditory sequence to be presented on the upcoming trial was 
shown on the screen for 16 s, followed by the text ‘Get ready’ for 3 s, then a fixation cross for 
1500 ms, followed by the first to-be-remembered item and the onset of the auditory sequence. 
The ‘no-forewarning’ block was identical except instead of a written transcription of the 
upcoming auditory sequence, the text ‘No information’ was displayed for 16 s. The 
experiment was run on a PC using an E-Prime 2.0 program (Psychology Software Tools) that 
controlled stimulus presentation. 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (Foreknowledge: with-foreknowledge, no-foreknowledge) × 4 
[Auditory condition: SS, Simple CS-unpredictable, Simple CS-predictable, Complex 
CS(sentence)] within-participant design. There were 80 trials divided into two blocks: a with-
forewarning block (40 trials) and a no-forewarning block (40 trials), the order of which was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each of the two blocks comprised 10 trials in each of the 
four auditory conditions. The order of the auditory conditions within a block was pseudo-
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random with the constraint that each condition was presented once every four trials and the 
immediate repetition of the same condition was restricted to once per auditory condition 
across a block. A unique sentence was used for each of the 20 Complex CS(sentence) trials 
encountered across the two blocks and a unique ordering of the 18 letters was used for each 
of the 20 Simple CS-unpredictable trials across the two blocks.  
The 20 sentences were divided into 2 sets of 10 (see Appendix 1). Half the 
participants within each block-order received Set 1 during the no-forewarning block and Set 
2 during the with-forewarning block while the reverse was the case for the other half of 
participants. At the end of the first block, an on-screen instruction appeared explaining that 
the second block would either involve the presentation of a written transcript of the upcoming 
auditory sequence or the presentation of the words ‘No information’ (depending on the block-
order for the given participant). 
Procedure 
Participants were first provided with a general set of instructions in which it was 
explained that they would be presented with auditory sequences during the to-be-remembered 
lists but that they were to ignore the sound the best they could. It also explained that in one 
block they would be provided with foreknowledge of the content of the upcoming auditory 
sequence and that in another block they would not. At the start of the first block, participants 
were given two practice trials (without an irrelevant sound sequence) to familiarize them with 
the serial recall task and the response interface. During the 16 s period during the practice 
trials at which, during the experimental trials, the written transcript of the upcoming auditory 
sequence or ‘No information’ text would appear, instructions were provided as to what they 
would see at that point in the experimental trials (e.g., ‘At this point in the experimental trials, 
you will see the text ‘No information’). They were also given two practice trials before the 
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second block which again included instructions about what would be presented during that 16 
s period of the trial.  
Following the final to-be-remembered item in each trial, the digits 1-9 were presented 
at random positions (different random positions for each trial) within a circular array on the 
screen. Participants were required to mouse-click on eight of the digits in the order in which 
they believed the digits had been presented on that trial. Beneath the circular array of digits, 
there were eight horizontally-arranged empty boxes. As the first digit was clicked within the 
circular array, it immediately appeared in the left-most box, as the second was clicked it 
appeared in the second left-most box and so on until all 8 boxes were filled. Participants were 
instructed that they could make a guess if they were unsure of any response or they could 
click on a ‘?’ that appeared in the centre of the circular array to record a ‘don’t know’ 
response. Participants were free to take as long as they wished to respond. After making 8 
responses, a cross appeared at the centre of the screen prompting participants to click the 
mouse to continue to the next trial. The experiment took approximately 1 hr. 
Results 
As standard, recalled items were only scored as correct if they appeared in the same 
absolute serial position as that in which they were presented. Figure 1 shows the proportion 
of correctly recalled items, collapsed over serial positions, in the four auditory conditions in 
the No-forewarning condition and the With-forewarning condition. The pattern of results is 
clear-cut and is precisely as predicted by the duplex-mechanism account: With no 
forewarning, disruption was produced in all CS conditions compared to the SS condition and 
this disruption was particularly marked in the Complex CS(sentence) condition. Moreover, 
there was little difference in the disruption caused by the Simple CS-unpredictable compared 
to the Simple CS-predictable sequence. The provision of forewarning had a clear but highly 
selective effect: Forewarning brought performance in the complex CS(sentence) condition up 
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to broadly the same level as that in the two Simple CS conditions, while having no effect on 
the disruptive potency of those simple CS sequences. 
A 4 (Auditory condition) × 2 (Forewarning) repeated-measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) corroborated the foregoing impression of the data: There was a main effect of  
 
       
Figure 1. Proportion correct recall in the four auditory conditions as a function of foreknowledge in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Auditory condition, F(3, 81) = 22.36, MSE = .006, p < .001, 
2
P = .45, but not of 
Foreknowledge, F < 1. Crucially, the interaction between Auditory condition and 
Foreknowledge was significant, F(3, 81) = 3.21, MSE = .006, p = .027, 
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P = .11. A simple 
effects analysis of this interaction confirmed the following pattern of effects: In the No-
foreknowledge condition, Simple CS-predictable and Simple CS-unpredictable sequences 
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account, there was no reliable difference between the Simple CS-predictable and Simple CS-
unpredictable conditions (p = .34). A supplementary Bayes factors analysis of this null effect 
(following Masson, 2011) showed that the posterior probability that the data favored the null 
hypothesis (that there is no difference between the two conditions) [pBIC (H0|D)], over the 
alternative hypothesis (that there is a difference) was .71. Furthermore, when we combined 
our data with those from the same two conditions from Experiment 1 of Marsh et al. (2014), 
then the pBIC (H0|D) was .88. Note also that the slight numerical difference between the post-
categorically predictable and post-categorically unpredictable conditions in our experiment 
was, in any case, in the opposite direction to that predicted by the predictability-based 
account. 
Performance was poorer in the Complex CS(Sentence) condition than any other 
condition (p < .02 for all contrasts). In the With-foreknowledge condition, in contrast, 
performance in the Complex CS(Sentence) condition rose to the same level as that found in 
the Simple CS conditions such that there was now no longer any difference between any of 
the CS conditions (all p > .05). But another theoretically important observation was that even 
with foreknowledge all CS sequences remained markedly disruptive compared to the SS 
sequence (all contrasts p < .001).  
Discussion 
 
 The results of Experiment 1 confirm the predictions of the duplex-mechanism account 
and are problematic for the predictability-based account. First, as already reported by Bell et 
al. (2017; see also Röer et al., 2015), a sentence produced more disruption than a sequence of 
unrelated verbal tokens (Simple CS-unpredictable condition). This is consistent with our 
hypothesis based on the duplex-mechanism account that a sentence produces an additional 
stimulus-specific attentional diversion effect over and above the (pure) acoustic-based 
changing-state effect that would be expected to be produced by both a sentence and a 
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sequence of unrelated tokens. At the same time, this result is problematic for the 
predictability-based account: The higher degree of predictability of successive tokens in a 
sentence means that a sentence should be less, not more, disruptive than a sequence of 
unrelated (and hence relatively unpredictable) tokens. Second, a more systematic and 
controlled manipulation of the post-categorical predictability of a sequence—a contrast 
between letter-names presented in alphabetical order compared to the same letters presented 
in a random order—had no effect (see also Marsh et al., 2014). Third, a written forewarning 
about the upcoming distractor sequence only reduced the disruption caused by the complex 
(sentence) sequence. Importantly, it reduced a sentence’s disruptive power only to the extent 
that a sentence then produced as much disruption as that produced by the purer changing-
state sequences (Simple CS-predictable and Simple CS-unpredictable).  
The finding that foreknowledge only brings performance with a sentence distractor to 
the same level as with simpler changing-state sequences is as predicted by the duplex-
mechanism account: The additional disruption caused by a sentence (and that which is 
reduced by foreknowledge) is due to stimulus-specific attentional diversion while the 
remaining disruption is due to its acoustic changing-state quality. Indeed, in line with this 
two-component account of the sentence effect, the disruptive impact of a single deviant sound 
(e.g., Hughes et al., 2007)—universally attributed to attentional diversion (and only 
attentional diversion)—is abolished by foreknowledge (Hughes et al., 2013).  
The limited nature of the reduction of a sentence’s disruptive potency produced by 
foreknowledge was also observed by Röer and colleagues. They argued that the remaining 
power of a sentence to disrupt performance despite foreknowledge, and the power of simpler 
changing-state sequences to do so regardless of foreknowledge, may be attributable to a 
‘basic call for attention’ that cannot be over-ridden by top-down knowledge. That is, the mere 
onset of each sound consumes attentional resources because each sound must be evaluated 
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with regard to whether a full attention switch to that sound is warranted. Thus, very much like 
our duplex-mechanism account, the predictability-based account invokes one form of 
distraction that is amenable to top-down control (e.g., via foreknowledge)—actual attentional 
diversion—and another that is not: a ‘basic-call-for-attention’-based distraction. At first 
glance, this seems to render the two theoretical accounts difficult to tease apart. Fortunately, 
however, the postulation that the residual effect of a sentence (with foreknowledge) and the 
effect of simple, even highly predictable, changing-state sequences is due to a ‘basic call for 
attention’ in fact affords a definitive test of the two accounts, which we carried out in 
Experiment 2.  
Experiment 2 
The interference-by-process account of the changing-state effect—in which the effect 
reflects a conflict between the processing of order information in the sound and the 
processing of order in the focal serial recall task—predicts, by definition, that there should be 
little or no interference if no order processing is being carried out to perform the focal task. 
This prediction has been confirmed numerous times by various research groups (Beaman & 
Jones, 1997; Elliott et al., 2016; Henson, Hartley, Burgess, Hitch, & Flude, 2003; Hughes et 
al., 2007; Jones & Macken, 1993; Joseph, Hughes, Sörqvist, & Marsh, 2018; see also Farley, 
Neath, Allbritton, & Surprenant, 2003; Neath, Guérard, Jalbert, Bireta, & Surprenant, 2009). 
This is in itself problematic for an attentional-diversion account of the changing-state effect 
because there is nothing in the account that would lead one to expect that the changing-state 
effect should be restricted to particular kinds of focal processes. Indeed, effects that all 
theorists agree are due to attentional diversion, such as that caused by a single deviant sound, 
are indeed not restricted to tasks that require or encourage order processing (Hughes et al., 
2007; Vachon, Labonté, & Marsh, 2017).  
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We capitalize on this key distinction between the interference-by-process and 
attentional-diversion accounts of the changing-state effect in Experiment 2 to provide a 
convergent and arguably definitive test of the two accounts in relation to the effects of 
complex sentential distracting material and its modulation by foreknowledge. If the residual 
effect of sentences (with foreknowledge) and the effect of simpler changing-state sequences 
(regardless of foreknowledge) is due to an indomitable ‘basic-call-for-attention’, then these 
effects should be found also even when order-processing is not used to perform the focal task. 
In contrast, on the duplex-mechanism account, a sentence (with foreknowledge) and 
relatively pure changing-state sequences (regardless of foreknowledge) should no longer 
produce much if any disruption. That is, on this account, once the stimulus-specific 
attentional diversion effect of a sentence has been eliminated by foreknowledge, it should, 
like purer changing-state sequences, have little or no disruptive effect compared to a control 
(steady-state) condition. This would show quite emphatically that it is precisely that portion 
of the disruptive effect of a sentence that is due to attentional diversion—and not that portion 
that is due to its changing-state quality—that is reduced by foreknowledge.  
In Experiment 2, then, we changed the focal task from serial recall to one that does 
not necessitate the retention of serial order (the missing-item task; e.g., Beaman & Jones, 
1997; Buschke, 1963; Hughes, Marsh, & Jones, 2011; Klapp, Marshburn, & Lester, 1983; 
Marsh et al., 2018). In the missing-item task, all but one of a familiar closed set of items are 
presented (e.g., eight digits from the set 1-9) in a random order and the task is to report which 
item was missing (e.g., 6 is missing from the list 31784952). Crucially, this task does not 
require the order of the presented items to be retained or reproduced. As predicted by the 
interference-by-process account, little or no changing-state effect is found in this task because 
there is little or no focal order processing to be interfered with by the involuntary processing 
of the order of the changing-state sequence (Beaman & Jones, 1997; Elliott et al., 2016; 
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Hughes et al., 2007; Jones & Macken, 1993; Joseph et al., 2018). Notably, effects that are 
universally attributed to attentional diversion such as that of a deviant sound (e.g., Bell et al., 
2017; Hughes et al., 2007) are indeed observed in the missing-item task and to a similar 
degree as they are in serial recall (Hughes et al., 2007; Vachon et al., 2017).  
The current experiment was a close replication of an experiment reported in Bell et al. 
(2017; see their ‘Replication in Sweden’ experiment, p. 365; hereafter, we refer to this as Bell 
et al.’s ‘Swedish experiment’) in which, like the present Experiment 1, foreknowledge 
reduced the disruptive effect of a sentence on serial recall. The critical difference in the 
present experiment was that the focal task was the missing-item task rather than serial recall. 
Thus, we contrasted the effect of three kinds of irrelevant auditory sequence—a steady-state 
word (SS), a simple changing-state sequence (a sequence of unrelated words; Simple CS), 
and a complex CS sequence (a sentence)4—on missing-item identification, with and without 
the provision of a forewarning about the content of the upcoming irrelevant sequence. As in 
Bell et al.’s (2017) Swedish experiment, the forewarning on this occasion involved not only a 
written transcript of the upcoming spoken distractor sequence but presenting the spoken 
sequence itself (that is, the spoken sequence was presented twice; once as part of the 
forewarning and once as the task-irrelevant auditory sequence accompanying the memory 
list).  
A further novel aspect of the present experiment was that, for the first time in the 
context of the study of auditory distraction, we systematically collected subjective report data 
regarding the strategy participants adopted to perform the missing-item task, using a 
questionnaire developed by Morrison, Rosenbaum, Fair, and Chein (2016). This was done in 
light of speculations that some participants may adopt a serial rehearsal strategy to perform 
                                               
4 Bell et al. (2017, Experiment 2) also included a condition with a single deviant sound. This condition was 
omitted here as it is not essential for the purposes of the present experiment (see also Footnote 3). 
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the missing-item task even though the task does not necessitate the processing of the order of 
the items and that this may explain the fact that, on occasion, changing-state sound has been 
found to disrupt missing-item task performance to some extent (Jones & Macken, 1993; 
Marsh et al., 2018). Indeed, Morrison et al. (2016) reported that 28.6% of their participants 
reported using a serial rehearsal or grouping strategy in the missing-item task.  
Thus, the predictions, based on our duplex-mechanism account, differed according to 
the focal-task strategy participants reported: For those reporting using some strategy other 
than serial rehearsal to perform the missing-item task—which we expected would be the 
majority—the predictions were as follows: The Simple CS sequence should produce little or 
no disruption compared to the SS condition, that is, there should be little or no changing-state 
effect. The Complex CS(sentence) sequence should disrupt performance compared to the 
Simple-CS and SS sequence because we argue that a sentence produces a stimulus-specific 
attentional diversion effect over and above any changing-state effect it may produce. Finally, 
foreknowledge about the upcoming irrelevant sequence should eliminate the disruption 
caused by the Complex CS(sentence) sequence, raising the level of performance in that 
condition to the same as that in the Simple-CS and SS conditions. In other words, in the 
presence of foreknowledge, there should no longer be any differences among any of the 
auditory conditions.  
The predictions of the duplex-mechanism account in relation to any participants 
reporting the use of a serial rehearsal strategy to perform the missing-item task are the same 
as those for Experiment 1 (and Bell et al.’s, 2017, Swedish experiment) using serial recall. 
This is because it is the engagement in serial rehearsal, not the nominal nature of the task per 
se, that renders performance susceptible to a changing-state effect (see, e.g., Beaman & 
Jones, 1998). That is, there should for these participants (and only these participants) be a 
residual disruptive effect of sentences (under foreknowledge) and an effect of the Simple-CS 
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sequence (regardless of foreknowledge) compared to the SS condition because the use of a 
serial rehearsal strategy will render them vulnerable to interference-by-process.  
In contrast, on the predictability-based account of the changing-state effect, the 
pattern of performance should replicate that reported in Bell et al. (2017) in the context of 
serial recall regardless of self-reported focal-task strategy, because this account does not posit 
any role for the qualitative nature of the processes used to perform the focal task. First, the 
Simple-CS sequence should, like in serial recall, disrupt performance compared to the SS 
sequence because of an indomitable basic-call-for-attention. Second, a sentence should 
disrupt performance more than the Simple-CS sequence, even though, as argued earlier, this 
prediction in fact appears to be opposite to that which flows from the predictability-based 
account of the changing-state effect. Third, foreknowledge should attenuate the disruptive 
effect of a sentence but a sentence should, like the Simple-CS sequence, still disrupt 
performance compared to the SS condition due, again, to a basic-call-for-attention. 
Participants. This experiment was conducted in the same laboratory and using the 
same participant pool (though different participants) as Bell et al.’s (2017) Swedish 
experiment. We aimed to recruit 72 participants on the basis that 28% of participants reported 
using a serial rehearsal/grouping strategy in Morrison et al. (2016) which would, in theory, 
have given us 20 participants for the ‘serial rehearsal’ group. While this is not a large 
number, we were confident that it would be sufficient given the robustness of the changing-
state effect. In the event, we were only able to recruit 62 participants in a timely fashion. 
Fortuitously, however, as described later, the percentage of participants reporting a serial 
rehearsal/grouping strategy turned out to be 40% in our experiment, hence we had 25 in the 
serial rehearsal group and 37 in the non-serial-rehearsal group.  
The 62 participants were students at the University of Gȁvle, Sweden, took part in the 
experiment in return for two cinema tickets. All reported normal hearing and normal or 
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corrected-to-normal vision. The study was conducted in accordance with the declaration of 
Helsinki and the ethical guidelines given by the American Psychological Association. All 
participants were adults and participated with informed consent. The participants signed an 
information agreement form. The study did not involve sensitive personal data, did not entail 
a physical intervention or methods with the purpose of affecting a research person, the data 
collection did not include apparent risk of injury, and no data could or can be traced to 
individual persons. Because of this, there was no external ethical review, in accordance with 
Swedish law. 
Apparatus and materials. Memory lists. The memory lists were, like, Experiment 1 
(and Bell et al.’s 2017, Swedish experiment), drawn from the digit set 1-9. Eight of these 
digits appeared sequentially in the central position of a computer monitor in black 100 pt 
equidistant Monaco font on a white background for 1 s each with no inter-stimulus interval. 
The digit missing from the list (and hence the digit to be identified) was determined randomly 
for each trial.  
Auditory sequences. There were three types of irrelevant auditory sequence: SS, 
Simple CS and Complex CS(Sentence) which were identical to the corresponding conditions 
from Bell et al.’s (2017) Swedish experiment. In the SS condition, a one-syllable word was 
randomly selected and repeated 8 times (e.g., “child, child, child, child, child, child, child, 
child”). In the Simple CS condition, 8 different monosyllabic words were presented in 
random order (e.g., “road, song, day, hear, went, man, hand, mine”; note that the actual words 
used for this and the SS condition were the Swedish monosyllabic translations of these 
words). The words for these conditions were sampled randomly without replacement from a 
pool of 128 of the most common monosyllabic words in the Swedish language. Finally, for 
the Complex CS(sentence) condition, coherent sentences were presented (e.g., the Swedish 
translation of: “Put water, lemon juice, and sugar into a pot. Bring it to boil, stirring 
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continuously, and progressively fold in the egg white”). Note that unlike the present 
Experiment 1, Bell et al. (2017) did not control for the number of words across the sentences 
nor the number of words in the sentence condition compared to the other two conditions; we 
did not either therefore in this experiment because the goal was to show that the same 
modulation of the sentence effect by foreknowledge found by Bell et al. (2017) using serial 
recall can also be found in the missing-item task under identical stimulus conditions. All 
auditory distractor sequences lasted 8 s each and were presented binaurally at approximately 
65 dB(A) through Sennheiser HD-202 headphones that participants wore throughout the 
experiment. All spoken material was recorded in the same voice and sampled with a 16-bit 
resolution at a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz using SoundForge 8 and edited with Audacity 
software (Audacity Development Team, 2015).  
Forewarning. In the foreknowledge condition, a transcript of the to-be-ignored 
sequence was visually-presented in 32 pt Monaco font for 16 s prior to the trial. Moreover, 
the auditory sequence that would be subsequently presented as the distractor sequence on that 
given trial was presented during the first 8 s of this pre-trial phase. For the no-foreknowledge 
block, the words “no information” were presented in 32 pt Monaco font during the 16 s pre-
trial phase, and no auditory sequence was played. Following the 16 s pre-trial phase, a blank 
white screen was presented for 1 s followed by the presentation of the first of the eight digits 
and the start of the accompanying auditory distractor sequence. The experiment was executed 
on a PC running an E-Prime 2.0 program (Psychology Software Tools) that controlled 
stimulus presentation and recorded participant responses. 
Design. The experiment had a 2 × 3 × 2 mixed-measures design, with Foreknowledge 
(with-foreknowledge, no-foreknowledge) and Auditory condition (SS, Simple CS, and 
Complex CS(Sentence) as within-participant factors and Task-strategy as a between-
participants factor (serial rehearsal, non-serial-rehearsal). The assignment of participants to 
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strategy-group was determined following data collection on the basis of their self-reported 
strategy-use (see Procedure). The dependent variable was whether or not, for each trial, the 
missing item was identified. The with-foreknowledge and no-foreknowledge trials were 
blocked and each block consisted of 8 trials per auditory condition, presented in a random 
order with the constraint that no two trials from the same condition were presented in 
immediate succession. The order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure. Two practice trials were undertaken before the experimental trials, one 
with foreknowledge and one without for each of the three auditory conditions. Following the 
offset of the last memory item of each trial, the digits 1 to 9 appeared in a horizontal array. 
Beneath the array there was a single response box. Participants were required to mouse-click 
on the digit corresponding to the digit that was missing from the just-presented list. Once a 
digit was selected, a copy of it appeared in the response box for 1 s before the program 
prompted the participant to click on a “Begin Trial” button to initiate the next trial. 
 Task-Strategy Questionnaire. Following completion of the last block of trials, a 
strategy questionnaire (Morrison et al., 2016) was administered onscreen to participants. We 
asked our participants to identify the strategy that they primarily used when undertaking the 
missing-item task. Following Morrison et al. (2016), participants were asked to endorse one 
of the following 10 strategies: I expected certain items to appear and mentally checked them 
off as they arrived (Checklist); I silently repeated the items (Rehearsal), I remembered the 
items in groups (Grouping); I thought about the way the items sounded (Sound); I answered 
based on what items seemed recent or familiar (Familiarity); I simply concentrated on the 
items (Concentrate); I created a visual image based on the meaning of the items (Imagery); I 
pictured the way the items looked on the screen (Look); I thought about other things that 
could relate to the items (Association); I used the meaning of the items to remember or 
connect them (Semantic). Participants could also indicate if they had used a strategy not 
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identified by the questionnaire (‘Another unidentified strategy’), or whether they used no 
particular strategy. Furthermore, there was also an option to indicate if they had not 
comprehended the demands of the missing-item task so that we were able to assert whether 
their selection of strategy appeared legitimate. The words presented in bold were adopted 
from Morrison et al. (2016) and presented to participants with the intention of highlighting 
the key characteristic of each strategy. However, the labels in parentheses represent the 
nomenclature Morrison et al. adopted for different strategies and were not presented to the 
participants. The order in which the strategies were presented was counterbalanced across 
participants to avoid response bias for locations within the list.  
Results 
The results of the task-strategy questionnaire showed that 25 of the 62 (40%) 
participants reported using a ‘serial rehearsal’ strategy or ‘grouping’ strategy (14 of the 25 
reporting the former, 11 the latter) to perform the missing-item task in this experiment despite 
the fact that the task does not nominally require the retention of order information. As 
grouping can be considered a process within the broader category of serial rehearsal (e.g., 
“Whatever else a grouping method is, it is a method of rehearsal”, Wickelgren, 1964, p. 414; 
see also Taylor, Macken, & Jones, 2015), we treated participants that reported either of these 
strategies as ‘serial rehearsers’. While this is a larger proportion than that reported by 
Morrison et al. (28.6%), for present purposes it is fortuitous that it is a relatively large 
number as it suits our objective of contrasting the pattern of auditory distraction effects as a 
function of task-strategy. The majority of participants (the remaining 37) reported using some  
kind of non-serial-rehearsal strategy (usually ‘checklist’ or an ‘Another unidentified 
strategy’5); these were combined to form a ‘non-serial-strategy’ group.  
                                               
5 Specifically, 18 of these 37 participants reported using a ‘checklist’ strategy, 9 reported using ‘another 
unidentified strategy’, 3 a ‘familiarity’ strategy, 2 reported ‘no particular strategy’, while ‘look’, ‘imagery’ 
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Figure 2 shows the data for the non-serial-strategy group (panel A) and for the serial 
rehearsers (panel B) according to auditory condition and foreknowledge. A 3(Auditory 
condition) × 2(Foreknowledge) × 2(Task-strategy) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
Auditory condition, F(2, 120) = 12.73, MSE = .025, p < .001, 
2
p  = .18, and, importantly, 
reliable interactions between Auditory condition and Foreknowledge, F(2, 120) = 7.41, MSE 
= .016, p < .005, 
2
p  = .11, and, of particular interest in the present experiment, between 
Auditory condition and Task-strategy, F(2, 120) = 3.18, MSE = .025, p < .05, 
2
p  = .05. The 
three-way interaction was not significant. Simple effects analyses of the reliable interactions 
showed the following pattern of effects: First, regardless of foreknowledge, there was a 
disruptive effect of the Simple-CS sequence compared to the SS sequence but, critically, only 
for the serial rehearsal group, p < .001, and not for the non-serial-strategy group, p > .05. In 
other words, supporting the duplex-mechanism account, only those who reported using a 
serial rehearsal strategy exhibited a changing-state effect and this effect, as in Experiment 1, 
was unaffected by foreknowledge. A supplementary Bayes factors analysis of the absence of 
a changing-state effect for the non-serial-strategy group showed that the posterior probability 
that the data favored the null hypothesis (that there was no difference between the two 
conditions), pBIC (H0|D), over the alternative hypothesis (that there was a difference) was 
.83.   
Second, collapsing across strategy-groups, in the absence of foreknowledge, sentences 
disrupted performance significantly more than did simple-CS sequences (again as in  
 
                                               
and ‘sound’ were each reported by 1 participant. An anonymous reviewer queried the extent to which the 
most popular of these (‘checklist’) might also entail a form of ‘rehearsal’. To clarify, therefore, our view is 
that whilst the checklist strategy may well involve a form of rehearsal, it does not entail the motor-based 
serial rehearsal of the list as presented (see, e.g., Jones et al., 2004). 
                                                                       When is Forewarned Forearmed?    32 
               
 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of lists for which the missing item was correctly identified as a function of 
auditory condition and foreknowledge for those participants who reported using a strategy other than 
serial rehearsal (Panel A) and those who reported using a serial rehearsal strategy (Panel B) in 
Experiment 2.  
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Experiment 1), p < .01, but, third, foreknowledge eliminated this disruptive sentence effect 
[Complex CS(Sentence) vs. Simple-CS, p > .05]. Thus, we observed a sentence effect in a  
context in which there is no changing-state effect (i.e., as evident from the pattern of 
distraction found for the non-serial-strategy group), and this sentence effect, unlike the 
changing-state effect, is eliminated by foreknowledge.  
Discussion 
The pattern of results from Experiment 2 provides strong support for the duplex-
mechanism account (e.g., Hughes, 2014; Hughes et al., 2005, 2013) and goes against the 
predictability-based account of distraction by changing-state sound (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et 
al., 2015). The latter account invokes a basic-call-for-attention mechanism in order to explain 
the fact that, in serial recall, a simple-CS sequence disrupts performance compared to a 
steady-state sequence despite foreknowledge (Bell et al., 2017; current Experiment 1). 
Because the account does not make different predictions as a function of the nature of the 
focal-task processing, it cannot explain the fact that, regardless of foreknowledge, a simple-
CS sequence is no longer disruptive when serial processing is not engaged to perform the 
focal task. The basic-call-for-attention construct was required also by the predictability-based 
account to explain the fact that, in serial recall, a sentence distractor still produces some 
degree of disruption even with foreknowledge (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015; present 
Experiment 1). Thus, the account is also seriously challenged by our finding that the effect of 
a sentence distractor is indeed completely abolished by foreknowledge in the context of a 
missing-item task so long as participants do not adopt a serial rehearsal strategy. In short, 
there is no evidence for an indomitable basic-call-for-attention mechanism, the inclusion of 
which was critical to the predictability-based account of the findings of Röer and colleagues.  
In contrast, the pattern of results confirms the predictions of the duplex-mechanism 
account: First, in line with the interference-by-process explanation of the changing-state 
                                                                       When is Forewarned Forearmed?    34 
               
 
effect incorporated within this account, there is only a changing-state effect when participants 
adopt a serial rehearsal strategy (such as in serial recall; Elliott et al., 2016; Hughes et al., 
2007 Jones & Macken, 1993; present Experiment 1) or when they happen to adopt a serial 
rehearsal strategy even when the task does not nominally call for order processing (present 
experiment). Indeed, the present experiment is the first to our knowledge to show the 
dependence of the changing-state effect on the serial nature of focal-task processing without 
manipulating the explicit demands of the task (cf. e.g., Jones & Macken, 1993) but by 
examining individual differences in spontaneous strategy-adoption within the context of the 
same task.6  
Second, the results of this experiment strongly support our central argument that a 
distractor sentence produces two functionally distinct forms of distraction: an attentional 
diversion effect and a changing-state effect, where only the former is attenuated by 
foreknowledge. This was shown by the finding that there is a sentence effect in a context in 
which there is no changing-state effect (as evident from the data from the non-serial-strategy 
group) and, moreover, this sentence effect—which we argue must be caused by attentional 
diversion—is abolished with foreknowledge.  
General Discussion 
The results of the present study support the duplex-mechanism account of auditory 
distraction (e.g., Hughes, 2014; Hughes et al., 2005) over the attentional account of Röer and 
                                               
6 While subjective reports are of course always to be treated with caution, there is good consensus that the 
kind of strategies in question in the present study involve explicit, effortful, processes, the kind that are 
most likely to be cognitively accessible and hence reportable (e.g., Smith & Miller, 1978; Schiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). There are aspects of Morrison et al.’s (2016) data that also point to the validity of the 
questionnaire. The fact that, for example, 25% of their participants reported using a ‘checklist’ strategy for 
the missing-item task (while only 1.8% participants reported such a strategy across all other tasks) and 
76.7% of participants reported using serial rehearsal or grouping to complete a serial recall task was clearly 
in line with apriori expectations based on convergent empirical evidence (e.g., that serial recall is 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of articulatory suppression, e.g., Baddeley et al., 1984).  
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colleagues. To summarize the key impacts of the present experiments, the predictability-
based account of the changing-state effect (Röer et al., 2015) was undermined by the finding 
that a post-categorically predictable changing-state sequence (“A, B, C, D…”) is no less 
disruptive than a post-categorically unpredictable changing-state sequence (e.g., “B, F, C, 
K…”). We also replicated the finding that a sentence is more disruptive than an unrelated 
sequence of tokens (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015) even though, again, the elements in 
the former are more predictable than in the latter. Experiment 1 also replicated the finding 
that, in serial recall, foreknowledge of the nature of an upcoming auditory distractor sequence 
selectively attenuates the disruptive effect of a sentence and does not affect the impact of 
‘simple changing-state speech’ (a sequence of unrelated verbal tokens) as compared to a 
steady-state verbal token. The two theoretical accounts offer different explanations for this 
pattern: From the standpoint of the duplex-mechanism account, we hypothesized that a 
sentence is disruptive in part due to a (stimulus-specific) attentional diversion effect that is 
functionally separate from an underlying, acoustic-based, changing-state effect caused by 
interference-by-process. On this account, it is the attentional-diversion portion of the sentence 
effect, not that attributable to interference-by-process, that is, like other attentional-diversion 
effects (e.g., the deviation effect; Hughes et al., 2007), attenuated by top-down control factors 
such as foreknowledge. Thus, the underlying changing-state effect is left unaltered by 
foreknowledge (cf. Hughes et al., 2013). The predictability-based account also attributes that 
portion of the sentence effect that is attenuated by foreknowledge to attentional diversion but 
attributes that portion of the sentence effect that is immune to foreknowledge (as well as the 
effect of a simple-CS sequence) to an indomitable basic-call-for-attention whereby the mere 
onsets of stimuli draw some attentional resources from a focal task. The results of 
Experiment 2 supported the duplex-mechanism explanation: When participants are not 
engaged in serial processing within the focal task, there is no changing-state effect (regardless 
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of foreknowledge) and only the portion of a sentence effect that we attribute to attentional 
diversion remains, as evident from the fact that the effect, like the deviation effect (cf. 
Hughes et al., 2013), is eliminated by foreknowledge.  
The present results, then, indicate that the findings of Bell et al. (2017) and Röer et al. 
(2015) have no bearing on the causal mechanism underlying the changing-state effect nor, 
therefore, on the interference-by-process explanation of that effect. As described in the 
Introduction, this explanation posits that the acoustic changes that underpin the changing-
state effect must be carried on a common stream, unlike, for example, the deviation effect 
(e.g., a single change of voice within the irrelevant sound sequence; Hughes et al., 2007) 
which we have argued causes (aspecific) attentional diversion because the change in this case 
marks the onset of a stimulus that does not fit any current stream. Evidence for the 
interference-by-process account comes from the finding that the relationship between the 
degree of change between successive sounds and their disruptive effect is non-monotonic. 
For instance, when the magnitude of change between successive tones is so large (e.g., 
ACACA…, where A and C differ by 10 semi-tones) that it is likely to cause the sequential 
partitioning of those tones into two, interleaved, steady-state streams (i.e., ACACA…), the 
disruption is less marked than with a sequence containing more modest changes and hence 
ones likely to be perceived as variation within a single stream (e.g., ABABA…; where A and 
B differ by only 5 semi-tones; Jones et al., 1999; see also Macken et al., 2003). As well as 
providing compelling support for the intimate link between streaming and the changing-state 
effect, such findings are difficult to reconcile with an attentional-diversion based account; it 
is far from clear how an attentional account could explain the non-monotonic relation 
between the amount of change and the degree to which serial recall is disrupted. 
The value of the findings of Röer and colleagues (Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015), 
then, lies instead in being the first to show that complex speech such as sentences have the 
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power to cause not only a changing-state effect but also attentional diversion. It is important 
to highlight, however, that the purpose of the present experiments was not to determine which 
of the properties of a sentence, or combination thereof, causes this additional attentional-
diversion effect; they were designed only to show that they have a functionally different 
disruptive effect over and above the changing-state effect. Nonetheless, it may be worth 
elaborating a little here on the stimulus-specific relevance hypothesis alluded to earlier. We 
speculate that whilst the elements in an unfamiliar sentence are indeed relatively 
unpredictable—the key construct invoked in Röer and colleagues’ account—this in itself is 
not the critical attention-diverting property of a sentence. Indeed, Experiment 1 showed quite 
clearly that unpredictability per se does not have disruptive power, with no difference being 
found between a post-categorically unpredictable sequence and a post-categorically 
predictable one. We suggest instead that the suprasegmental meaning and hence ‘relevance’ 
or ‘interest’ of a sentence to a human participant is key to its attention-diverting power. It is 
already known that such suprasegmental features are processed even though the speech is to 
be ignored (Röer, Bell, Körner, & Buchner, 2019). In this view, then, the key action of 
foreknowledge is to make the sentence more familiar and hence less interesting. That is, 
whilst foreknowledge would indeed increase the predictability of the successive elements in 
the sentence (part of what increased familiarity would entail), we speculate that it is the fact 
that the increased familiarity renders the sentence less interesting that is instrumental in 
attenuating its disruptive effect. Thus, we suggest that the additional disruptive effect of a 
sentence (over and above the changing-state effect) is mainly if not entirely driven by its 
post-categorical content, not by physical-level violations of expectancies (as in the acoustic 
deviation effect, Hughes et al., 2013). Note that this stimulus-specific based account can also 
explain why a sentence tends to be more disruptive than what could reasonably be 
characterized as the less meaningful and hence less interesting/relevant sequences used for 
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the simple-CS sequences in the present experiments (“F, H, B, E…” or “road, song, day…”; 
see also Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 2015) despite the fact the successive elements in these 
simple-CS sequences are less predictable.  
A potential difficulty for the foregoing stimulus-specific relevance hypothesis is that 
it would seem to predict that forward narrative speech should be more disruptive than speech 
that is foreign to the participant or rendered meaningless by being presented backwards, when 
several studies suggest that this is not the case (Jones, Miles, & Page, 1990; Marsh, Hughes, 
& Jones, 2009; Röer, Körner, Buchner, & Bell, 2017b). However, we note that the 
meaningful distractor material in these studies was always either a sequence of individual 
words (which, as already noted, may have relatively low relevance/interest value in any case) 
or presented in the form of a narrative from a single literary source that continued throughout 
the experimental session (Jones et al., 1990) in contrast to the discretely-presented (i.e., trial-
by-trial), variously-themed, sentences as used here (and in Bell et al., 2017; Röer et al., 
2015). Indeed, we have emerging evidence that discrete sentences presented in a forward 
direction and in a language the participant understands are indeed more disruptive than 
sentences presented in reverse or in a language foreign to the participant (Marsh, Kershaw, 
Vachon, & Hughes, in preparation). One possibility, therefore, is that continuous narrative 
speech (when presented as task-irrelevant material) soon loses its meaning or interest for the 
participant (and hence its attention-diverting power) whereas discrete novel sentences varying 
in content and intonation appear to have more sustained attention-diverting power. At first 
glance, however, the results of a study by Röer et al. (2014) seem to contradict those of 
Marsh et al. (in prep.) and hence the conclusions we have drawn from them. Röer et al. 
(2014) found that discretely-presented sentences played forwards were no more disruptive of 
serial recall than the same sentences played backwards. The first thing to note is that this null 
effect, if taken at face value, poses a problem not only for our stimulus-specific relevance 
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hypothesis but also for the predictability-based account because a sentence is clearly more 
predictable than the same sentence presented backwards. That is, the predictability-based 
account predicts that a backward sentence should be more disruptive than a forward sentence. 
The second point, however, is that a feature of Röer et al.’s (2014) method means that their 
results do not cause a difficulty for the stimulus-specific relevance hypothesis after all. 
Specifically, for a given participant, the same sentence (whether forward or backward) was 
presented for all trials in the given condition (moreover, unlike the present experiments, 
auditory condition was blocked). From the standpoint of the stimulus-specific relevance 
account, such repeated presentation of the same sentence across a block of trials may soon 
strip that sentence of its relevance and hence attention-diverting power; indeed, such 
repetition would, in effect, be akin to having foreknowledge of the auditory sequence. The 
difficulty that Roer et al.’s (2014) results pose for the predictability-based account remains 
however: the fact that the sentence was repeated does not alter this account’s (incorrect) 
prediction that a backward sentence should be more disruptive than a forward sentence. 
Indeed, if anything, the difference between conditions should be even greater as memory for 
(and hence foreknowledge of) a forward sentence that is repeated from trial-to-trial is likely 
to be better than for a repeating backward sentence. 
The same stimulus-specific attentional diversion account as offered here for the effect 
of sentences has been applied recently to account for other post-categorical auditory 
distraction effects during serial recall that also appeared, otherwise, to undermine the 
interference-by-process account of disruption by changing-state sound (Marsh et al., 2018). 
Specifically, serial recall is disrupted to a greater degree by a sequence of emotionally valent 
compared to neutral words. This has been taken as evidence against the notion that the 
disruptive impact of sound on serial recall is attributable purely to the sound’s acoustic, pre-
categorical, characteristics (Buchner et al., 2004, 2006). In Marsh et al. (2018), however, we 
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tested the hypothesis that this additional effect of valence is, like the sentence effect studied 
here, due to stimulus-specific attentional diversion that is unrelated to an underlying 
changing-state effect. In line with our hypothesis, we showed that promoting an increase in 
focal-task engagement by making the visual to-be-remembered items more difficult to encode 
eliminates the valence effect—just as it does the deviation effect (Hughes et al., 2013)—but 
has no impact on the disruptive effect of words per se (compared to quiet). Moreover, similar 
to the present Experiment 2 in terms of its logic, Experiment 2 of Marsh et al. (2018) showed 
that a valence effect is also found in the missing-item task but that the general effect of words 
is significantly attenuated, providing convergent evidence that the valence effect, too, is 
unrelated to the classical changing-state effect.  
To conclude, the present results reinforce our contention that all post-categorical 
auditory distraction effects in serial recall—including the particularly disruptive effect of 
sentences, valent words (Buchner et al., 2006, 2004), one’s own name (Röer et al., 2013), 
taboo words (Röer et al., 2017a), and so on—are epiphenomenal; they are attentional 
diversion effects that have, unlike the changing-state effect, relatively little relevance to the 
understanding of serial recall or short-term memory more generally because they are found 
outside these domains. Thus, the present findings (see also Elliott et al., 2016; Joseph et al., 
2018; Marsh et al., 2018) underscore the importance of determining, whenever serial short-
term memory is found to be impaired by task-irrelevant sound, which of two distinct 
mechanisms of distraction—attentional diversion and interference-by-process—is at play or 
the degree to which each might be contributing to the total amount of disruption.  
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Appendix 1: Sentences Used in Experiment 1 
 
Set 1 
1. (Weather forecast). A widespread frost at first, perhaps the odd mist or fog patch, and 
then bright with sunny spells. 
2. (Weather forecast). A cold and raw day with a chilly north-easterly wind, showery 
rain, chiefly to the south-east. 
3. (Prose). Let them have everything - health, food, a place to live, entertainment - they 
are and remain unhappy and low. 
4. (Prose). I object to violence because when it appears to do good; the good is 
temporary, evil is permanent. 
5. (Cooking recipe). Put over a medium heat and warm, whilst stirring constantly, until it 
is very thick and just bubbling. 
6. (Scientific text). No obvious distinction was found for the lower critical solution 
temperature and swelling response to a temperature jump. 
7. (Poem). “That I scarce was sure I heard you"- here I opened wide the door, darkness 
there, nothing more. 
8. (Operating manual). Old taps may seize in the closed position and thus prevent the 
water from reaching into the machine. 
9. (Road message). Congestion caused by vehicles restricts emergency, recovery or 
winter maintenance vehicles from providing assistance or from clearing roads. 
10. (Aphorism). Millions long for immortality but do not know what to do with 
themselves on a rainy Sunday afternoon. 
 
 
Set 2 
1. (Weather forecast). A cold start for many, then most places dry with sunny spells, 
cloudier in the southeast with rain. 
2. (Weather forecast). Mainly dry with the best of the cloud breaks around the North Sea 
coast, clouds thickening at times. 
3. (Prose). All things are subject to interpretation whichever interpretation prevails at a 
given time is a function of power. 
4. (Prose). Humanity is an ocean; if a few drops of the ocean are dirty, the ocean doesnt 
become dirty. 
5. (Cooking recipe). Whisk in the mashed date mixture, then fold into the egg white 
mixture until it is well combined. 
6. (Scientific textbook). The decrease of crosslinker dosage or increase of chain length 
thereof could enhance swelling capacities of the hydrogels 
7. (Poem). Christmas is coming. The goose is getting very fat, please put a penny in the 
old man’s hat. 
8. (Operating manual). Remove the four protective screws and the rubber bush with the 
respective spacer, situated on the appliance’s rear 
9. (Road message). Travel conditions are dangerous and you should avoid the specified 
roads, if you travel, you may experience disruption. 
10. (Aphorism). The optimist proclaims we live in the best of possible worlds; and the 
pessimist fears this is true. 
 
